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BILLINGS GAZETTE V. CITY OF BILLINGS:
EXAMINING MONTANA’S NEW EXCEPTION TO THE
PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO KNOW
Adam Wade*
I. INTRODUCTION
Montana’s Constitution contains a Declaration of Rights that includes
two competing fundamental protections: the right to know and the right of
privacy.1 Montana citizens possess a fundamental right to know about their
government.2 At the same time, the right of privacy protects citizens from
unwanted government intrusion.3
When these two rights conflict, a legal balancing test must be applied
to determine the prevailing right.4 Montanans have the right to examine all
documents and deliberations of public agencies, except when “the demand
of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure.”5 His-
torically, the Montana Supreme Court “has been particularly vigilant and
uncompromising” in defending the public’s right to know.6 However, in the
2013 decision of Billings Gazette v. City of Billings,7 the Court deviated
from established precedent and created a public trust exception to Mon-
tana’s right to know. Billings Gazette undermines the public’s right to know
and confuses a previously well-defined area of Montana law. This decision
is likely to cause unpredictable results in future cases and should be revis-
ited and overruled at the first opportunity.
This note analyzes Billings Gazette from a historical perspective and
assesses the future implications of the decision. Section II provides the legal
* Adam Wade is a second year law student at the University of Montana. Adam grew up in
Missoula, Montana and graduated from the United States Air Force Academy with a degree in Econom-
ics. He reached the rank of Captain before deciding to return home for law school. The author would
like to thank his family and the members of the Montana Law Review for their unwavering support
throughout the writing process. Special thanks to Jean Weldele, Stacey Weldele-Wade, Jon Wade, Caro-
line Wade, and Mike Prendergast. Additional thanks belong to Calli Oiestad, Professor Anthony John-
stone, Thomas Bourguignon, and Caitlin Boland Aarab.
1. Mont. Const. art. II, §§ 9–10.
2. Mont. Const. art. II, § 9.
3. 1971–1972 Montana Constitutional Convention Verbatim Transcript vol. V, 1681 (1981) (Con-
vention delegate transcripts leading to the creation of Mont. Const. art. II, § 10).
4. Billings Gaz. v. City of Billings, 313 P.3d 129, 133 (Mont. 2013) (citing Havre Daily News v.
Havre, 142 P.3d 864, 869 (Mont. 2006)).
5. Mont. Const. art. II, § 9.
6. Fritz Snyder, The Right to Participate and the Right to Know in Montana, 66. Mont. L. Rev.
297, 311 (2005) (citing Goldstein v. Comm’n on Practice of the Sup. Ct. of Mont., 995 P.2d 923, 946
(Mont. 2000) (Nelson, J., dissenting)).
7. 313 P.3d 129.
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background and overview of the tension between Montana’s constitutional
right to know and the right of privacy. Section III describes the background,
arguments, and opinions in Billings Gazette. Section IV analyzes Billings
Gazette; it first examines the key factors overlooked by the majority, next
explores the faulty public trust factor, and finally, discusses the problems
Billings Gazette will create for future case law. Section V concludes the
note.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The right to know is firmly ingrained in the history of the United
States. In our nation’s infancy, Patrick Henry captured the essence of the
public’s right to know when he stated, “the liberties of a people never were,
nor ever will be, secure when the transactions of their rulers may be con-
cealed from them.”8 The right to know is a truly American concept that
stems from Colonial America’s distrust of expansive government power.9
Today, nearly every state and the federal government have statutory provi-
sions that protect the public’s right to know.10 However, the express decla-
ration of the right to know found in the Montana Constitution gives the
right more prominence than it has in most other states.11
Montana is one of only five states to expressly establish the right to
know in its constitution.12 This right to know expanded the implied right
provided under the U.S. Constitution and created a more robust right for
Montana citizens.13 Montana’s right to know states, “[n]o person shall be
deprived of the right to examine documents or to observe the deliberations
of all public bodies or agencies of state government and its subdivisions,
except in cases in which the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds
the merits of public disclosure.”14 Intended to promote public awareness
and protect individual citizens, the right to know protects citizens’ “efforts
to scrutinize governmental operations.”15 Additionally, the right to know
provides a reminder to public employees that their jobs exist to “serve the
needs of the public and no other.”16
8. Rick Applegate, Bill of Rights 111 (Const. Conv. Study No. 10, 1972).
9. Id. at 2.
10. David Gorman, Rights in Collision: The Individual Right of Privacy and the Public Right to
Know, 39 Mont. L. Rev. 249, 257 (1978).
11. Snyder, supra n. 6, at 298 (citing N.H. Const. pt. 1, art. 8; Fla. Const. art. I, § 24).
12. Id.
13. Patricia A. Cain, The Right to Privacy under the Montana Constitution: Sex and Intimacy, 64
Mont. L. Rev. 99, 102 (2003) (citing State v. Hyem, 630 P.2d 202, 208 (Mont. 1981); Mont. Human
Rights Div. v. City of Billings, 649 P.2d 1283, 1286 (Mont. 1982)).
14. Mont. Const. art. II, § 9.
15. Applegate, supra n. 8, at 5.
16. 1971–1972 Montana Constitutional Convention, supra n. 3, at 1657.
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When courts balance conflicting interests between the right to know
and the right of privacy, the public’s right to know has often been given
more weight than the right of privacy. The delegates to the 1972 Montana
Constitution Convention anticipated conflicts between these competing
rights and added the word “clearly” to the right-to-know provision in a de-
liberate effort to tip the balance in “favor of the right to know.”17 Overall,
the delegates intended the right to know to serve as a tool to open the
“doors and desks of government to the eyes and ears of the governed.”18
The delegates to the 1972 Montana Constitution Convention intended
to place a thumb on the scale favoring the public’s right to know, but they
did not intend to create an absolute right.19 The counterpart to the right to
know is Montana’s constitutionally protected right of privacy, which states
that “[i]ndividual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and
shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.”20
Montana provides the “strongest protection for privacy rights of any state in
this country”21 and the judiciary “jealously guard[s]”22 this constitutional
right under the “most stringent standard of judicial review.”23
While Montana staunchly protects the right of privacy, the right is not
without limit. In State v. Long24 the Montana Supreme Court held the right
of privacy “contemplates privacy invasion by state action only;” it does not
protect citizens from privacy invasions by private citizens.25 In Great Falls
Tribune v. Montana Public Service Commission,26 the Court explained right
of privacy protections apply only to “natural human beings and not to non-
human entities.”27 In sum, ordinary citizens are given the right of privacy,
but government agencies are not.
At its root, the right of privacy is a precautionary measure put in place
to create a “semipermeable wall of separation between individual and
state,” which means the state may intrude in certain aspects of our private
lives, but it must have a good reason for its actions.28 The Montana Consti-
17. Id. at 1670.
18. Fritz Snyder, Montana’s Top Document: Its Transition into the 21st Century, 34 Mont. Law. 8,
9 (2009) (quoting Delegate James Garlington in 1971–1972 Montana Constitutional Convention Verba-
tim Transcript vol. VII, 3027 (1981)).
19. 1971–1972 Montana Constitutional Convention, supra n. 3, at 1670.
20. Mont. Const. art. II, § 10.
21. Cain, supra n. 13, at 101.
22. State v. Hubbel, 951 P.2d 971, 980 (Mont. 1997).
23.  Mont. Human Rights, 649 P.2d at 1286 (citing Gorman, supra n. 10, at 251).
24. 700 P.2d 153 (Mont. 1985).
25. Id. at 157 (emphasis added).
26. 82 P.3d 876 (Mont. 2003).
27. Id. at 883.
28. Long, 700 P.2d at 157 (quoting 1971–1972 Montana Constitutional Convention, supra n. 3, at
1681).
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tutional Convention delegates understood the tendency of government
agencies to encroach on the lives of private citizens. As a result, the dele-
gates concluded when “government functions and controls expand, it is nec-
essary to expand the rights of the individual.”29
However, the right of privacy is not absolute and at times must com-
pete with other fundamental rights, such as the public’s right to know.30
Further, the Montana Constitutional Convention delegates “made a clear
and unequivocal decision that government operates most effectively, most
reliably, and is most accountable when it is subject to public scrutiny.”31 To
achieve this goal, the delegates drafted Montana’s right to know as “a re-
sponse to the penchant for secrecy in government by state and local offi-
cials.”32 The delegates concluded that in the long term, the privacy concerns
of individual public employees were “outweighed by the dangers of a gov-
ernment beyond public scrutiny.”33 As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
eloquently stated, “[d]emocracy functions ill in shadow, yet government bu-
reaucracies are notoriously reluctant to reveal their internal processes.”34
The Montana Supreme Court understood this unfortunate reality, and re-
mained “particularly vigilant and uncompromising in protecting
Montanans’ constitutional ‘right to know.’”35 In its efforts to protect the
public’s right to know, the Montana Supreme Court frequently “reject[s]
other governmental bodies’ attempts to limit or subvert this right.”36
The conflict between the public’s right to know and the individual pri-
vacy rights of public employees creates a frequent source of tension, and
the battle for supremacy continues to this day.37 When a conflict between
the public’s right to know and a public employees’ right of privacy arises, a
court must first determine whether the public employee has a constitution-
ally protected right of privacy.38 That question requires a two-part analysis:
(1) whether the person has a subjective or actual expectation of privacy, and
(2) whether society is willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.39
Applying this framework in cases involving public employees’ privacy
rights, there are two distinct categories of Montana Supreme Court deci-
29. 1971–1972 Montana Constitutional Convention, supra n. 3, at 1681.
30. Long, 700 P.2d at 167.
31. Snyder, supra n. 6, at 311.
32. Id. at 297.
33. Id. at 311 (citing Great Falls Trib. v. Day, 959 P.2d 508, 516 (Mont. 1998)).
34. Kowack v. U.S. Forest Serv., 766 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2014).
35. Snyder, supra n. 6, at 311 (quoting Goldstein v. Comm’n on Prac. of the Sup. Ct. of Mont., 995
P.2d 923, 946 (Mont. 2000) (Nelson, J., dissenting)).
36. Id.
37. See e.g. Billings Gaz., 313 P.3d 129.
38. Yellowstone Co. v. Billings Gaz., 143 P.3d 135, 140 (Mont. 2006).
39. Mont. Human Rights, 649 P.2d 1283, 1287 (1982) (adopting the privacy test set forth in Katz
v.U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
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sions: (1) cases in which the public’s request for information is related to
the official duties of the public employee,40 and (2) cases in which the pub-
lic employee received express assurances of confidentiality that fostered a
reasonable expectation of privacy.41 While the Court never expressly stated
its reliance on these underlying factual categories, the pattern in the Court’s
treatment cannot be denied. In the first category, the Court favors the pub-
lic’s right to know over the individual’s right of privacy.42 In the second
category, the Court favors public employee privacy rights.43 Keeping these
general principles in mind, the following section presents a brief history of
key Montana right-to-know cases.
A. Information Related to the Official Duties of Public Employees
Each of the following cases involves right-to-know requests that were
directly related to a public employee’s position and official duties. In these
cases, the Montana Supreme Court tipped the scales in favor of the public’s
right to know.
In Great Falls Tribune Co. v. Cascade County Sheriff,44 a law enforce-
ment officer drove his patrol car onto the sidewalk while attempting to stop
a fleeing suspect and struck the suspect.45 An investigation ensued, which
resulted in one termination, one suspension, and two resignations for the
officers involved.46 The city allowed the local newspaper access to the in-
vestigative report, but redacted the names of the disciplined officers, citing
the officers’ rights of privacy.47 The Tribune sued, seeking an order from
the court directing the city to release the names of the officers.48 The dis-
trict court ordered disclosure of the officers’ names and the Montana Su-
preme Court affirmed.49 The Court acknowledged the sensitive nature of
the officers’ situation, but held the officers’ privacy interests did not clearly
exceed the merits of public disclosure because the misconduct occurred in
40. See e.g. Billings Gaz. v. City of Billings (Anthony), 267 P.3d 11 (Mont. 2011); Yellowstone Co.,
143 P.3d 135; Svaldi v. Anaconda-Deer Lodge Co., 106 P.3d 548 (Mont. 2005); Jefferson Co. v. Mont.
Std., 79 P.3d 805 (Mont. 2003); Bozeman Daily Chron. v. City of Bozeman Police Dept., 859 P.2d 435
(Mont. 1993); Citizens to Recall Whitlock v. Whitlock, 844 P.2d 74 (Mont. 1992); Great Falls Trib. v.
Cascade Co. Sheriff, 775 P.2d 1267 (Mont. 1989).
41. See e.g. Missoulian v. Bd. of Regents, 675 P.2d 962 (Mont. 1984).
42. See e.g. Billings Gaz. (Anthony), 267 P.3d 11; Yellowstone Co., 143 P.3d 135; Svaldi, 106 P.3d
548; Jefferson Co., 79 P.3d 805; Bozeman Daily Chron., 859 P.2d 435; Whitlock, 844 P.2d 74; Cascade
Co. Sheriff, 775 P.2d 1267.
43. Missoulian, 675 P.2d 962.
44. 775 P.2d 1267 (Mont. 1989).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1267–1268.
48. Id. at 1267.
49. Id.
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the line of the officers’ official duties. The Court ruled in favor of the news-
paper’s request and ordered the city to release the officers’ names.50
In Citizens to Recall Whitlock v. Whitlock,51 a citizens’ group sought
the release of an investigatory report resulting from sexual harassment and
discrimination accusations against Whitlock, the mayor of Hamilton.52 The
district court authorized the release of the investigator’s report and the
Mayor appealed.53 The Montana Supreme Court ruled in favor of the citi-
zens’ group and noted two important reasons why Mayor Whitlock’s pri-
vacy rights did not outweigh the public’s right to know. First, elected offi-
cials must be subject to public scrutiny because the public is responsible for
“hiring, disciplinary action, and supervision”;54 and second, the “nature of
the information” at issue “was the result of an investigation into misconduct
related to the performance of [the Mayor’s] official duties, rather than gen-
eral performance evaluations or a discussion of Whitlock’s character, integ-
rity, honesty, or personality.”55
In Bozeman Daily Chronicle v. City of Bozeman Police Department,56
a police officer resigned after a Montana Law Enforcement Academy cadet
accused him of sexual intercourse without consent.57 Citing the public’s
right to know, a local newspaper attempted to obtain the accused police
officer’s name and the resulting investigative documents.58 The district
court ordered that the newspaper be provided a copy of the initial offense
report but denied the newspaper’s request for disclosure of the resulting
investigative documents.59 On appeal, the Court tipped the scale in favor of
the public’s right to know and remanded the case with instructions to con-
duct an in camera inspection of the investigative documents to determine
what information should be released to the newspaper.60 To reach its deci-
sion, the Court relied on Whitlock and concluded public officials must be
“subject to public scrutiny in the performance of [their] duties.”61
In Jefferson County v. Montana Standard,62 a newspaper sought infor-
mation pertaining to a county commissioner’s arrest for driving under the
50. Cascade Co. Sheriff, 775 P.2d at 1269.
51. 844 P.2d 74 (Mont. 1992).
52. Id. at 76.
53. Id. at 75.
54.  Id. at 77.
55. Billings Gaz., 313 P.3d at 136 (citing Whitlock, 844 P.2d at 78).
56. 859 P.2d 435 (Mont. 1993).
57. Id. at 436–437.
58. Id. at 437.
59. Id. at 436.
60. Id. at 442.
61. Bozeman Daily Chron., 859 P.2d at 440 (citing Whitlock, 844 P.2d. at 77).
62. 79 P.3d 805 (Mont. 2003).
6
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influence of alcohol.63 The district court ordered disclosure and the county
commissioner appealed.64 The Court ruled in favor of the newspaper. The
Court held the nature of the county commissioner’s public position ren-
dered “her decision to violate the law directly relate[d] to her ability to
effectively perform her job duties.”65 The Court concluded that “informa-
tion relating to an official’s ability to perform public duties should not be
withheld from public scrutiny.”66
In Svaldi v. Anaconda-Deer Lodge County,67 various parents accused a
public school teacher of assaulting and/or verbally abusing their children
and filed a complaint with the county attorney’s office.68 When contacted
by a reporter about the incident, the district attorney informed the reporter
that his office was considering deferring the prosecution in exchange for the
teacher’s promise of immediate retirement.69 The teacher alleged the disclo-
sure violated her right of privacy and sued the county and the school dis-
trict.70 The district court granted the county’s motion for summary judg-
ment and the teacher appealed.71 The Court held the assault allegations
were directly related to the teacher’s official duties.72 The Court further
explained that the county attorney was not required to withhold the infor-
mation from public scrutiny even though criminal charges were never
filed.73
In Yellowstone County v. Billings Gazette,74 a newspaper sought un-
redacted deposition transcripts from a discrimination case brought against
an Interim Chief Public Defender.75 The newspaper moved the court to re-
lease the un-redacted transcripts when the County refused to comply with
the newspaper’s request.76 The district court ordered disclosure of the docu-
ments but allowed certain portions of the Interim Chief’s deposition to be
redacted.77 The Gazette appealed and the Montana Supreme Court reversed
the district court and remanded the case.78 The Court upheld the public’s
63. Id. at 807.
64. Id. at 806.
65. Id. at 809.
66. Jefferson Co., 79 P.3d at 809 (citing Bozeman Daily Chron., 859 P.2d at 440; Whitlock, 844
P.2d at 78).
67. 106 P.3d 548 (Mont. 2005).
68. Id. at 549.
69. Id. at 550.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 549.
72. Id. at 553.
73. Svaldi, 106 P.3d at 553.
74. 143 P.3d 135 (Mont. 2006).
75. Id. at 137–138.
76. Id. at 138.
77. Id. at 137.
78. Id.
7
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right to know because the redacted information was directly related to the
Interim Chief’s official conduct and there was no evidence to suggest the
Interim Chief asserted a privacy interest in the deposition transcript.79
In Billings Gazette v. City of Billings,80 a newspaper sought access to
the official investigative documents resulting from an administrative em-
ployee’s unauthorized use of a police department credit card.81 The City
declined to disclose the investigative documents because the employee was
potentially facing criminal charges.82 The Gazette sued and the district
court ordered the City to provide the documents to the newspaper.83 On
appeal, the Court again upheld the public’s right to know, and held the
administrator did not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy because
society would not be willing to recognize a privacy interest as reasonable
“when the information sought bears on that individual’s ability to perform
public duties.”84
B. Express Assurances of Confidentiality
When a public employee receives express assurances of confidential-
ity, Montana precedent favors the employee’s right to privacy over the pub-
lic’s right to know certain information. In Missoulian v. Board of Regents,85
a newspaper sought performance evaluations for six university presidents
who were previously promised evaluation confidentiality.86 The district
court found for the Board of Regents and the Montana Supreme Court af-
firmed the district court.87 The Court determined the public’s right to know
did not outweigh the presidents’ privacy rights and sealed the evaluations
from public disclosure.88 The Court attached significant weight to the ex-
press assurances of confidentiality previously given to the presidents.89 The
Court also weighed the subjective nature of the presidents’ evaluations and
noted the possible “vindictive” uses of the evaluations against disliked em-
ployees.90 The Court held the “mere status” of the individual does not con-
trol the right-to-know analysis and determined the university presidents
“[did] not waive their constitutional protections by taking office.”91
79. Id. at 140.
80. Billings Gaz. (Anthony), 267 P.3d 11 (Mont. 2011).
81. Id. at 13.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 17–18 (quoting Yellowstone Co., 143 P.3d at 140).
85. 675 P.2d 962 (Mont. 1984).
86. Id. at 963–964.
87. Id. at 963.
88. Id. at 974.
89. Id. at 968.
90. Id. at 970.
91. Missoulian, 675 P.2d at 969.
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III. BILLINGS GAZETTE V. CITY OF BILLINGS
A. Factual Background
In 2012, the City of Billings (“City”) investigated and ultimately sus-
pended five employees (“Employees”) without pay for a period of five days
for viewing pornographic material on City computers during work hours.92
The Employees actively defeated the City’s computer security system and
violated the express terms of the City’s computer Acceptable Use Policy.93
The Billings Gazette (“Gazette”) requested the City’s investigative records
about the matter, but the City cited the Employees’ privacy rights and de-
nied the requests on two separate occasions.94 After the Gazette’s third re-
quest, the City provided copies of the records with all Employee identifica-
tion information removed from the documents.95 The Gazette argued the
information was subject to Montana’s right to know and sought court inter-
vention to release the Employees’ identities.96
B. District Court’s Decision
Relying upon federal and state precedent, the district court examined
whether a privacy interest existed in this case; that is, whether the Employ-
ees had an actual or subjective expectation of privacy that society is willing
to accept as reasonable.97 The district court found the Employees had a
subjective expectation of privacy,98 but held their privacy expectations were
unreasonable in light of the City’s Acceptable Use Policy. The district court
concluded the Employees’ privacy rights did not “clearly exceed the merits
of public disclosure.”99 The court ordered the City to turn over the com-
plete, un-redacted records. However, the district court also granted the
City’s motion to stay the order pending appeal.100
C. The Parties’ Arguments on Appeal
1. City of Billings’ Argument
On appeal, the City argued that disclosing the identities of the Employ-
ees would violate the Employees’ privacy rights because the records at is-
92. Billings Gaz., 313 P.3d at 131–132.
93. Id. at 143 (McKinnon & Cotter, JJ., dissenting).
94. Id. at 132 (majority).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 145 (McKinnon & Cotter, JJ., dissenting).
98. Billings Gaz., 313 P.3d at 145 (McKinnon & Cotter, JJ., dissenting).
99. Id. at 148 (citing Mont. Const. art. II, § 9).
100. Id. at 132 (majority).
9
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sue were not public writings and were subject to a reasonable expectation of
privacy.101 The City further argued that Montana precedent favored the
right of privacy for public employees not involved in illegal activities and
that public employees do not waive their rights “simply because they are
employed by a municipality.”102
The City contended that unlike elected officials, the Employees were
not subject to the public’s right to know because the Employees’ privacy
rights could not be infringed without a “compelling state interest.”103
Therefore, since the Gazette had already reported the incident (shielding
only the Employees’ identities from public disclosure), members of the
public already had ample information to satisfy their right to know.104 The
City concluded that revealing the Employees’ identities would not advance
the public’s right to know and would only serve to embarrass the Employ-
ees.105
2. Billings Gazette’s Argument
The Gazette offered five arguments to counter the City’s claims. First,
the Employees’ identities were located in “public documents” for which
there was no reasonable expectation of privacy.106 Second, the City’s Ac-
ceptable Use Policy expressly removed all privacy expectations.107 Third,
the Employees’ conduct could be characterized as illegal under the Com-
puter Fraud and Abuse Act, and by the City’s own admission, such a char-
acterization would subject the Employees to the public’s right to know.108
Fourth, in redacting the Employees’ identifying information, the City vio-
lated both the right to know and the freedom of the press guaranteed by the
First Amendment. This violation occurred because the City usurped the Ga-
zette’s right to fully inform the public and assess the fairness of the City’s
punishments.109 Finally, even if the Employees had a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy, the public’s right to know outweighed the Employees’ ex-
pectations.110
101. Appellant’s Opening Br., Billings Gaz. v. City of Billings, 2013 WL 1292500 at *9 (Mont. Mar.
14, 2013) (No. DA 12-0739).
102. Id. at **9–10.
103. Id. at **10–12.
104. Id. at **10–11.
105. Id.
106. Appellee’s Answer Br., Billings Gaz. v. City of Billings, 2013 WL 2391299 at **9–10 (Mont.
May 15, 2013) (No. DA 12–0739).
107. Id. at **16, 22–24.
108. Appellee’s Answer Br., Billings Gaz. v. City of Billings, 2013 WL 2391299 at *18 (Mont. May
15, 2013) (No. DA 12-0739) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2013)).
109. Id. at **19–20 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, 723–724 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
concurring)).
110. Id. at *29.
10
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D. Montana Supreme Court Majority Opinion
With two Justices dissenting, the Montana Supreme Court reversed the
district court and ruled in favor of the Employees.111 The Court did not
address whether the documents requested by the Gazette were “public docu-
ments” subject to the right to know and claimed the issue was moot because
the Gazette already published the details of the Employees’ misconduct.112
Nevertheless, the Court suggested the requested information was not part of
a public document because internal disciplinary matters become part of an
employee’s personnel file, which an employee reasonably expects to remain
confidential.113
The Court determined the Employees’ use of government computers
and their collective breach of government security measures to view porno-
graphic websites during work hours “was not related to their public du-
ties.”114 The majority did not address whether the Employees’ expectations
of privacy were reasonable in light of the City’s Acceptable Use Policy,
which expressly stated that Internet use on City computers was not private
and would be monitored.115
The Court placed decisive weight on the absence of criminal charges
against the Employees and reasoned that the misconduct in this case did
“not rise to the level of illegal conduct” present in prior right-to-know
cases.116 Relying on the absence of criminal charges, the Court determined
that “an allegation of misconduct by a public employee does not summarily
end the privacy analysis.”117
The Court weighed the Employees’ expectations of privacy against the
merits of public disclosure and concluded privacy “clearly” outweighed the
merits of public disclosure considering the Employees’ status (not holding
positions of public trust) and the nature of their misconduct.118 This balanc-
ing approach placed decisive weight in the amount of “public trust” inher-
ent in the Employees’ positions and deemphasized crucial underlying facts
such as the City’s Acceptable Use Policy.119 Applying this analysis, the
Court primarily relied on the distinguishable facts of Missoulian and con-
cluded that society would accept a public employee’s expectation of pri-
vacy for “internal disciplinary matters when that employee is not in a posi-
111. Billings Gaz., 313 P.3d at 141.
112. Id. at 133.
113. Id. at 139 (citing Mont. Human Rights, 649 P.2d at 1288).
114. Id. at 138.
115. Id. at 134.
116. Id. at 139.
117. Billings Gaz., 313 P.3d at 139.
118. Id. at 141.
119. Id. at 140.
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tion of public trust.”120 This decision created a poorly defined hierarchy of
“public trust” that left the majority and dissent with different conclusions
based upon the same in camera inspection.121
E. Dissenting Opinion
Beginning with the majority’s misstatement of the issue, the dissent
objected to almost every aspect of the majority opinion. The dissent dis-
agreed with how the majority framed the issue and argued the majority
redefined the pertinent inquiry “to recognize a privacy interest that other
courts have uniformly held to be unreasonable.”122 The dissent argued the
majority incorrectly analyzed the Employees’ expectations of privacy as ap-
plied to “internal disciplinary proceedings.”123 Instead, the Court should
have simply determined whether Montana citizens would recognize a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy for public employees who violated the ex-
press terms of the City’s Acceptable Use Policy.124
The dissent argued the Employees did not possess a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in viewing pornographic materials on City computers be-
cause the City’s Acceptable Use Policy expressly removed all expectations
of privacy.125 Specifically, the City’s Acceptable Use Policy warned each
Employee that Internet use on City computers was not anonymous and
would be monitored.126
The dissent criticized the majority’s failure to apply the knowledge
gained from the Court’s in camera inspection, namely, that some of the
Employees held “upper-level positions and/or were involved in law en-
forcement.”127 The dissent took issue with this critical omission and stated
the majority ignored the Gazette’s valid argument that favored the public’s
“right to assess whether the City meted out discipline fairly.”128
The dissent also took issue with the majority’s deviation from prece-
dent regarding the illegality of the Employees’ misconduct. Specifically, the
dissent objected to the majority’s reliance on the lack of criminal charges
filed against the Employees. According to the dissent, the majority’s actions
“[put] the cart before the horse” because the information the City redacted
120. Id. at 140–141.
121. Id. at 138, 143 (McKinnon & Cotter, JJ., dissenting) (majority and dissent arrived at different
conclusions while applying the poorly defined “public trust” analysis to the same in camera inspection).
122. Id. at 142.
123. Billings Gaz., 313 P.3d at 142 (McKinnon & Cotter, JJ., dissenting).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 141.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 143.
128. Id.
12
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was “precisely the information the public has the right to know in order to
evaluate conduct of public officials.”129
Finally, the dissent objected to the majority’s personnel file rationale.
The dissent stated, “[c]ontrary to the Court’s reasoning, . . . the City’s
placement of the final disciplinary report in each Employee’s personnel file
does not give the document protections that it otherwise would not
have.”130 The City’s Acceptable Use Policy effectively extinguished all ex-
pectations of privacy relating to the Employees’ use of City computers.131
Therefore, the mere act of placing the documents in a personnel file did not
resurrect the Employees’ expectations of privacy.132
IV. ANALYSIS
Montana provides an interesting venue in which to analyze public em-
ployee privacy rights because of the inherent conflict between Montana’s
heightened individual privacy rights and the public’s right to know. Despite
this tension, Montana’s precedent indicates the public’s right to know is
greater when the requested information is related to the official duties of a
public employee133 and the public employee did not receive express assur-
ances of confidentiality that fostered a reasonable expectation of privacy.134
The Court in Billings Gazette made several errors, created confusion in
a previously clear area of Montana law, and improperly used its powers of
equity to reach a shortsighted decision that will cause problematic results in
future Montana cases. First, the Court deviated from decades of consistent
precedent. The Court ignored the Employees’ misconduct while taxpayers
paid the Employees to perform their official duties and ignored the City’s
Acceptable Use Policy, which expressly removed all expectations of pri-
vacy related to the Employees’ use of City computers. Second, the Court
erred when it gave an investigative report (comprised of objective computer
use violations) the same level of privacy protection afforded to private per-
sonnel files. Third, the Court downplayed the Employees’ involvement in
arguably criminal activities by focusing on the fact that no criminal charges
were actually filed. Finally, the Court assigned too much weight to the Em-
ployees’ potential embarrassment while balancing the Employees’ privacy
129. Billings Gaz., 313 P.3d at 144 (McKinnon & Cotter, JJ., dissenting).
130. Id. at 147.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See Billings Gaz. (Anthony), 267 P.3d 11; Yellowstone Co., 143 P.3d 135; Svaldi, 106 P.3d 548;
Jefferson Co., 79 P.3d 805; Bozeman Daily Chron., 859 P.2d 435; Whitlock, 844 P.2d 74; Cascade Co.
Sheriff, 775 P.2d 1267.
134. See Missoulian, 675 P.2d 962.
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interests against the merits of public disclosure.135 Although the Court’s
decision to avoid embarrassing the Employees is admirable, it came at the
high price of creating ambiguous precedent that will cause problematic, un-
predictable results in future Montana cases.
A. Notable Errors in Billings Gazette
1. The Court’s Deviation from Precedent
Before Billings Gazette, the Montana Supreme Court overwhelmingly
favored the public’s right to know when the underlying facts of a case in-
volved misconduct that was directly related to a public employee’s official
duties.136 After Billings Gazette, this clearly defined aspect of Montana
right-to-know analysis no longer exists. The Employees’ misconduct in
Billings Gazette was clearly related to their official duties. The Employees
breached City security measures to view prohibited material during work
hours.137 The Employees’ misconduct exposed the City’s network to un-
known threats and robbed taxpayers of the very services their tax dollars
were intended to provide.138 While this misconduct occurred, the Billings
taxpayers in effect paid the Employees to peruse expressly prohibited on-
line materials. Regardless of the Employees’ positions, this misconduct was
directly related to their official duties because the Employees could not per-
form any official tasks while participating in this misconduct. The facts in
Billings Gazette are similar to previous Montana right-to-know decisions,
and the Court should have followed established precedent and honored the
public’s right to know.
The following illustrates the factual similarities between Billings Ga-
zette and Montana’s right-to-know precedent to highlight the Billings Ga-
zette Court’s deviation from established precedent.
(1) Like the police officer in Cascade County Sheriff, the Employees’
misconduct occurred during (what should have been) the perform-
ance of their official duties.
(2) Like Whitlock, the information at issue in Billings Gazette was not
“related to private sexual activity, general performance evaluation,
or proceedings where [the Employees’] character, integrity, honesty,
or personalit[ies] were discussed.”139 Rather, the information “was
135. Billings Gaz., 313 P.3d at 146 (McKinnon & Cotter, JJ., dissenting).
136. See Billings Gaz. (Anthony), 267 P.3d 11; Yellowstone Co., 143 P.3d 135; Svaldi, 106 P.3d 548;
Jefferson Co., 79 P.3d 805; Bozeman Daily Chron., 859 P.2d 435; Whitlock, 844 P.2d 74; Cascade Co.
Sheriff, 775 P.2d 1267.
137. Billings Gaz., 313 P.3d at 143 (McKinnon & Cotter, JJ., dissenting).
138. Id.
139. Whitlock, 844 P.2d at 78.
14
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the result of an investigation into misconduct related to the perform-
ance of [the Employees’] official duties.”140
(3) Like the police officer in Bozeman Daily Chronicle, the Employees
took part in expressly prohibited misconduct during the performance
of their official public duties.141
(4) Like the County Commissioner in Jefferson, the Employees’ mis-
conduct was “directly relate[d] to [their] ability to effectively per-
form [their] job duties.”142 While the Commissioner’s misconduct
(driving under the influence with an expired license) was only tan-
gentially related to her ability to perform her official duties, the Em-
ployees’ misconduct actually rendered them incapable of performing
their official duties while the misconduct occurred. The Jefferson
Court concluded “information relating to an official’s ability to per-
form public duties should not be withheld from public scrutiny” and
favored the public’s right to know even though the Commissioner’s
misconduct did not occur in the performance of her official public
duties.143 Here, the Court in Billings Gazette had even more reason
to honor the public’s right to know because the Employees’ miscon-
duct directly interfered with their ability to perform their official
public duties.
(5) Like the School District in Svaldi, the City conducted an internal
investigation after allegations of misconduct that directly related to
the Employees’ official duties. Like the School District, the City
compiled the findings of the investigation in a comprehensive re-
port.144 The Svaldi Court ordered public disclosure of the investiga-
tive documents and favored the public’s right to know because the
alleged misconduct was related to the teacher’s official duties.145
(6) Like the Interim Chief in Yellowstone,146 the Employees did not as-
sert any privacy interests before disclosing information they later
sought to protect. Additionally, like the information contained in the
Yellowstone transcripts, the investigative reports in Billings Gazette
were directly related to the Employees’ official duties. However, un-
like Yellowstone, the City expressly removed all expectations of pri-
vacy relating to the Employees’ use of City computers.
(7) Finally, like the Administrator’s misconduct in Anthony,147 the Em-
ployees’ misconduct was directly related to their official duties and
involved public funds. Here, the City paid the Employees’ salaries
during their misconduct. Furthermore, the City devoted additional
funds to the legal battle that followed the Employees’ miscon-
duct.148 Anthony correctly favored the public’s right to know be-
140. Id.
141. Bozeman Daily Chron., 859 P.2d at 440.
142. Jefferson Co., 79 P.3d at 809.
143. Id. at 807, 809 (citing Bozeman Daily Chron., 859 P.2d at 440; Whitlock, 844 P.2d at 78).
144. Billings Gaz., 313 P.3d at 131–132; Svaldi, 106 P.3d at 549.
145. Svaldi, 106 P.3d at 553.
146. Yellowstone Co., 143 P.3d 140.
147. Billings Gaz. (Anthony), 267 P.3d 11.
148. Billings Gaz., 313 P.3d at 144 (McKinnon & Cotter, JJ., dissenting).
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cause the Administrator’s misconduct was directly related to official
duties and involved significant public funds.
The pattern in case law prior to Billings Gazette supports the conten-
tion that Montanans have the right to know about public employee miscon-
duct that is related to an employee’s official duties. Unfortunately, Billings
Gazette contradicted decades of Montana Supreme Court decisions and
erased this clear precedent. Billings Gazette leaves Montana practitioners
with more questions than answers.
2. Assurances of Confidentiality
Before Billings Gazette, Montana precedent only favored public em-
ployee privacy interests for work-related information when the employee
received express assurances of confidentiality. After Billings Gazette, this
clearly defined aspect of Montana right-to-know analysis no longer exists.
Missoulian represents Montana’s primary authority favoring public em-
ployee privacy interests for work-related information.149 The Missoulian
Court ruled in favor of the university presidents and protected their privacy
interests because the presidents received express assurances of confidential-
ity.150 However, unlike the Missoulian presidents, the Employees did not
receive any assurances of confidentiality, express or otherwise. In fact, the
City took affirmative steps to remove all expectations of privacy related to
the Employees’ use of City computers. The Billings Gazette Court should
have recognized this important distinction and honored the public’s right to
know. Unfortunately, Billings Gazette erased this bright line and created an
anomaly in Montana case law that causes confusion and will produce un-
predictable results in future cases.
3. Objective Records Treated as Personnel Files
By ruling in favor of the Employees, the Billings Gazette Court im-
properly applied personnel file privacy protections to a report that summa-
rized objective computer use violations. This faulty analysis required a leap
of logic and a misapplication of the distinguishable facts of Montana
Human Rights Division v. Billings.151 In Montana Human Rights, the
Human Rights Commission (“HRC”) requested access to private employee
personnel records.152 The Court ordered the records released, but strictly
limited disclosure to the HRC.153 The privacy interests in Billings Gazette
149. Missoulian, 675 P.2d 962.
150. Id. at 968.
151. Mont. Human Rights, 649 P.2d 1283.
152. Id. at 1285.
153. Id.
16
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(an objective report with all privacy interests expressly removed) are quite
different from the privacy interests in Montana Human Rights (the entire
contents of employee personnel files with all associated expectations of pri-
vacy). While the Employees in Billings Gazette waived their privacy inter-
ests with their assent to the City’s Acceptable Use Policy, the Montana
Human Rights employees provided no such waiver and maintained a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy.154 These two cases are distinguishable; and
the Billings Gazette Court improperly relied upon Montana Human Rights
to reach its decision.
Citing Montana Human Rights, the Billings Gazette Court asserted,
“public employees possess a privacy right in their personnel files” because
such files contain sensitive information.155 Although there is nothing
facially wrong with the Court’s assertion, the statement does not apply to
the facts of Billings Gazette. As the dissent correctly noted, “the City’s
placement of the final disciplinary report in each Employee’s personnel file
does not give the document protections that it otherwise would not
have.”156 The City’s Acceptable Use Policy removed all of the Employees’
privacy interests in the documents requested by the Gazette, and the simple
act of placing the documents in the Employees’ personnel file does not
resurrect their privacy interests.157
4. Possible Criminal Conduct
The Court in Billings Gazette improperly relied on the absence of
criminal charges and ignored a crucial aspect of Montana right-to-know
analysis that could have avoided the Court’s erroneous result. As identified
in Billings Gazette, public employees do not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy for allegations that arise in a criminal context.158 Before Billings
Gazette, when a public employee faced allegations of potential criminal
misconduct that were related to the employee’s official duties, the Court
favored the right to know even in the absence of official criminal
charges.159 Like the police officer in Bozeman Daily Chronicle, the Em-
ployees faced allegations of illegal conduct, but never faced actual criminal
charges.160 And like the newspaper in Bozeman Daily Chronicle, the Ga-
zette simply attempted to access the identity of the individuals involved in
the alleged criminal activity. Ultimately, the state did not file criminal
154. Id. at 1287–1288.
155. Billings Gaz., 313 P.3d at 139 (majority).
156. Id. at 147 (McKinnon & Cotter, JJ., dissenting).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 140, 144 (majority).
159. Bozeman Daily Chron., 859 P.2d at 437; Svaldi, 106 P.3d at 553.
160. Bozeman Daily Chron., 859 P.2d at 436–437.
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charges against the police officer in Bozeman Daily Chronicle, yet the
Court still factored the officer’s potentially criminal conduct into its analy-
sis and concluded the requested information was subject to the public’s
right to know.161 The Court in Svaldi also favored the public’s right to
know the details of the investigative report despite the lack of criminal
charges against the teacher.162 Therefore, the Billings Gazette Court im-
properly relied on the absence of criminal charges and should have fol-
lowed the clear precedent set forth in Bozeman Daily Chronicle and Svaldi
and honored the public’s right to know.
5. Potential for Employee Embarrassment Given Undue Weight
The Billings Gazette majority gave undue weight to the Employees’
potential embarrassment in its analysis and needlessly “carve[d] out an ex-
ception” to well-established precedent to protect the Employees from em-
barrassment.163 The majority correctly noted the Gazette already published
the details of the Employees’ misconduct and claimed the public already
knew the pertinent details of the events in question, with only the Employ-
ees’ identities omitted.164 However, the majority concluded the public al-
ready possessed “all the information it need[ed] to voice its opinions” and
claimed the potential for Employee embarrassment outweighed the “limited
merits” of releasing the Employees’ identities.165 While the Court is free to
assign weight to relevant facts at its discretion, the Court must do so under
the guiding principles of established case law. Regardless of the Court’s
admirable reasons for protecting the Employees from embarrassment, this
decision created a poorly defined exception for Montana right-to-know
analysis that will be difficult to apply consistently in future cases.
6. Gazette’s Valid First Amendment Argument Unaddressed
The Court in Billings Gazette did not address the Gazette’s valid First
Amendment argument and may have overstepped its constitutional author-
ity when it did not allow the Gazette to publish the Employees’ identities.
As Justice Douglas noted in his concurring opinion in New York Times Co.
v. United States,166 “[t]he dominant purpose of the First Amendment [is] to
prohibit the widespread practice of governmental suppression of embarrass-
161. Id. at 440.
162. Svaldi, 106 P.3d at 553.
163. Billings Gaz., 313 P.3d at 146 (McKinnon & Cotter, JJ., dissenting).
164. Id. at 141 (majority).
165. Id. at 141, 146.
166. N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, 723–724 (1971).
18
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ing information.”167 This compelling statement provides obvious applica-
tions in Billings Gazette, but unfortunately the Montana Supreme Court did
not address this crucial analysis.
There are several important parallels that can be drawn between New
York Times and Billings Gazette. In New York Times, the United States
government tried to prevent the New York Times and the Washington Post
from publishing the contents of a classified study about the government’s
decision-making processes during the Vietnam War.168 The Supreme Court
held the United States did not meet its heavy burden to justify its prior
restraint on the newspapers’ freedom of expression.169 Here, like the United
States in New York Times, the City attempted to prevent the Gazette from
publishing potentially embarrassing information. However, unlike New
York Times, the City was not trying to protect the contents of a classified
study and merely wanted to protect the Employees’ identities from being
associated with viewing pornographic material during work hours. The gov-
ernment had a much more compelling interest in preventing public disclo-
sure in New York Times than in Billings Gazette, yet the U.S. Supreme
Court protected the newspapers’ rights to publish in New York Times, and
the Montana Supreme Court prevented the newspaper from publishing in
Billings Gazette. The facts in Billings Gazette lend even stronger support
for the Gazette’s ability to determine the content of its own publication than
New York Times; therefore, the Court should have respected the Gazette’s
discretion and released the Employees’ identities.
B. Problematic Future Treatment
Billings Gazette eroded the public’s right to know, created ambiguous
precedent that will cause unpredictable results in future cases, and left many
unresolved questions.
1. Erosion of Montanans’ Right to Know
Billings Gazette improperly bolstered public employee privacy protec-
tions and recognized a privacy interest “that other courts have uniformly
held to be unreasonable.”170 The Court concluded society should be willing
to accept “a public employee’s expectation of privacy in his or her identity
with respect to internal disciplinary matters when that employee is not in a
167. Appellee’s Answer Br., Billings Gaz. v. City of Billings, 2013 WL 2391299 at **19–20 (Mont.
May 15, 2013) (No. DA 12–0739) (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, 723–724 (1971) (Doug-
las, J., concurring)).
168. N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. at 714.
169. Id.
170. Billings Gaz., 313 P.3d at 142 (McKinnon & Cotter, JJ., dissenting).
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position of public trust, and the misconduct resulting in the discipline was
not a violation of a duty requiring a high level of public trust.”171 However,
this decision eroded the fundamental protections provided by Montana’s
right to know and effectively insulated public employee misconduct from
public scrutiny when the employee does not occupy a position of “public
trust.”
Neither Montana precedent, nor the founding principles of Montana’s
right to know support the creation of a “public trust” exception to the pub-
lic’s right to know. Montana case law does not support the Billings Gazette
decision; the right to know was originally created to serve as a tool to open
the “doors and desks of government to the eyes and ears of the gov-
erned.”172 The 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention Transcripts do not
mention a public trust exception and the delegates implicitly understood
that “[p]ublic awareness and access seem to be the only tools to remind the
great mass of public servants that their job is to serve the needs of the
public and no other.”173 Billings Gazette created an unwarranted exception
to Montana’s right to know and eroded a fundamental public right. This
decision delivered a significant blow to the public’s right to know and se-
verely weakened society’s ability to hold public employees accountable for
their misconduct in the future.
2. Unpredictable Results in Future Cases
Billings Gazette will cause unpredictable results in future cases be-
cause it created ambiguous precedent that will be difficult to apply in a
consistent manner. The Court concluded society would be willing to accept
“a public employee’s expectation of privacy in his or her identity with re-
spect to internal disciplinary matters when that employee is not in a position
of public trust.”174 To reach this decision, the Court relied on a vague hier-
archy of public trust, but failed to define the very position it relied upon.
The Court offered a few examples of “public trust” positions to guide future
holdings, but some of the Court’s own examples come with their own
unique challenges. To illustrate this point, the Court offered a “high-level
employee” as an example of a position with inherent public trust.175 How-
ever, the Court failed to describe what constitutes a “high-level employee.”
Therefore, future Montana cases must decipher the Court’s ill-defined ex-
amples.
171. Id. at 140 (majority).
172. Snyder, supra n. 18, at 9 (quoting Delegate James Garlington in 1971–1972 Montana Constitu-
tional Convention Verbatim Transcript vol. VII, 3027 (1981)).
173. 1971–1972 Montana Constitutional Convention, supra n. 3, at 1670.
174. Billings Gaz., 313 P.3d at 140.
175. Id.
20
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3. Unresolved Questions
Billings Gazette created a quagmire of unresolved questions that must
now wind their way through the Montana court system. The following illus-
trates the four main questions left unresolved by the Billings Gazette deci-
sion:
(1) What is a position of public trust? The Billings Gazette Court failed
to adequately define the very position that created the exception to
Montana’s right to know.
(2) When the disputed information is related to the official duties of
public employees, how will the underlying facts––that once dictated
the outcome of Montana right-to-know analysis––come into play?
(3) Is it fair to assume that all allegations of misconduct involve some
measure of “internal discipline?” If so, how will the courts address
and define this term in the future? Billings Gazette redefined public
employees’ reasonable expectations of privacy in Montana, and the
future impact of this decision is unclear.
(4) What are the future implications of the Billings Gazette Court’s fail-
ure to apply the terms of the City’s Acceptable Use Policy, which
expressly removed all expectations of privacy related to the Employ-
ees’ misconduct on City computers?
V. CONCLUSION
The Court in Billings Gazette made a critical error in its analysis when
it favored the Employees’ privacy rights over the public’s right to know.
This case ignored the rationale behind Montana’s right-to-know provision,
contradicted decades of consistent precedent, and created a confusing ex-
ception in a formerly well-defined area of law. Instead of basing its decision
on a poorly defined hierarchy of public trust, the Court should simply have
evaluated the underlying facts in accordance with prior analogous decisions
and assessed the Employees’ privacy interests in light of their misconduct.
The Employees’ misconduct was directly related to their official duties, and
the Employees did not receive any express assurances of confidentiality.
Therefore, the Employees did not possess any reasonable expectations of
privacy, and the public had every right to know about their work-related
misconduct. This decision represents a significant departure from well-es-
tablished precedent and should be overruled at the first available opportu-
nity.
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